King Philip's War

Item Set

Items

• The Battle of Moore's Brook
  The Massachusetts Council orders a force of 200 militiamen and allied Natick Indians to attack the Wabanaki village of Ossipee. Commanded by Captain Benjamin Swett and Lieutenant James Richardson, this force arrived by ship at Black Point on June 28th, 1677. However, Squando and his Wabanaki warriors ambushed this force just a few miles from the garrison, slaughtering dozens of English and (including Swett and Richardson) and Natick Indians. Squando’s decisive victory at Moore’s Brook compelled the English to seek peace with the Wabanaki Confederacy.
• The Treaty of April 1678
  The English (represented by Major Shapleigh of Kittery and Captain Champernoon and Mr. Fryer of Portsmouth) conclude a peace treaty with Squando and other Eastern Indian Sachems at Casco. English settlers in Maine will pay the Indians one peck of corn annually for each family and one bushel to the proprietor Major Pendleton. Belknap considers this a necessary concession given the “advantages of trade and fishery [129].” English merchants had likely sold guns and ammunition to the Eastern Indians, which has been lawful since 1657. However, Belknap labels St. Castin as the culpable supplier of their arms and ammunition, which they “always husbanded…with much care [131].” The original treaty was apparently lost, and Belknap’s History of New-Hampshire is the best record of it.
• English Seamen Drown Squando's Son
  In the summer of 1675, the wife and infant daughter of Squando (sachem of the Saco Wabanakis) were traveling by canoe when they were accosted by several English fishermen. The Englishmen seized the infant and threw her in the water, apparently to test the popular (and racist) belief that Indian children naturally knew how to swim like baby animals. While Squando’s wife immediately dove into the river and retrieved her, the infant died a few days later. Outraged by the incident, Squando led the Saco Indians into war with the English.
• The Treachery of Major Richard Waldron
  Soon after the English defeated King Philip’s Indian alliance in Southern New England, Major Richard Waldron was ordered by the Massachusetts government to discuss a peace with the Wabanaki Indians at his home in Cochecho [Dover], New Hampshire. However, Waldron also had secret orders to assemble a force of 400 militiamen and allied Indians and hide them in ambush. Soon after negotiations began, Waldron’s men sprung from the woods and seized 200 Wabanaki sagamores and warriors. Waldron sent these prisoners to Boston, where the governor executed seven or eight and sold the others into slavery in the Caribbean. Outraged by Waldron’s treachery, the Wabanaki Confederacy resumed its war against New England.
• Diogenes Madoasquarbet to MA Governor John Leverett
  Sachem Diogenes Madoasquarbet writes to Massachusetts Governor John Leverett to explain the grievances of the Kennebec Wabanakis. The sachem describes how paranoid English colonists came “when we were quiet and took away our guns and made prisoner of our chief sagamore and that winter for want of our guns there were several who starved.” In response to English threats to continue the war “as long as there is an Indian in the country,” Diogenes asserts “[w]e are the owners of the country and it is wide and full of Indians and we can drive you out but our desire is to be quiet [maintain neutrality].” This letter illustrates the Kennebec Wabanaki diplomatic position and the English culpability for the war.
• Major General Daniel Denison [to MA Governor John Leverett]
  Major General Daniel Denison reports to Massachusetts Governor John Leverett that he tried to raise men for the "designe of visiting the enemys head quarters" but had little success. Although the Wabanakis had not joined the war, both Denison and Governor Levrett assumed they will soon join the Indian "uprising" led by the Wampanoag sachem Metacom (King Philip). Denison's letter testifies to English paranoia about an Indian "uprising" across New England. He notes it is "hardly imaginable the pannick fear that is upon our upland plantations & scattered places [in Maine] deserting their habitations." Ironically, growing English mistrust actually pushed the Wabanaki peoples to side with King Philip in September 1675.
• Anthony Brockholst & Others to MA Governor & Council
  Captain Anthony Brockles, Captain Caesar Knapton, and Matthias Nicolls write to Governor John Leverett and the Massachusetts Council. The officers report that they have negotiated a peace with “with the Indyan Sachems of Kenebeck [Indian Sachems of Kennebec] which are all betweene that River & Penobscott [Penobscot & Kennebec Rivers]: It is done upon Condicon of their forbearance to make Warre upon any of his Majstes Subjects, & delivery of all English prisoners to us here.” Brockles and his fellows add that “the Indyans [Indians] that were under Squando, have deserted him, lookiug on him as an Imposteur, & blame his bloudynesse, & that hee went privately away with one or two onely with him.” But Squando was not as ostracized as the English chose to believe, and the peace soon deteriorated between the Wabanakis and New England.
• [MA Governor & Council] Letter to Capt. Brockles & Others
  Massachusetts Governor John Leverett and the Massachusetts Council write to Captain Anthony Brockles, commandant of the English fort at Pemaquid, Maine. They inform Brockles of the ongoing negotiations for peace with the Kennebec and Penobscot Abenakis, which they seek “for the redemption of those miserable Soules Captives.” To that end, they have sent Major Denison and Esquire Joseph Dudley, who are “fully Instructed to effect the same with such others as are knowne unto & desired by the Indians in a late Aplication to us by the principall Sachem of the Kennebecke Indians.”
• Instructions to Major Richard Waldron
  In late January 1677, The Massachusetts Council orders Major Richard Waldron to raise 200 men for an attack on the Kennebec Wabanaki village of Norridgewock. The Council orders Waldron to “endeavor wth all silence & secresy to surprise them in their quarters.” If attacking Norridgewock is untenable, the Council dictates that he “save & rescue the English prisoners. If you should fade in this designe you shall assay by all meanes in your power to disturb & destroy the enemy, unless you shall have such overtures from them, & may give some competent assurance that an honorable & safe peace may be concluded wth them.” The Englishmen would find Norridgewock abandoned, and much like Waldron’s betrayal in September 1676, the raid galvanized Wabanaki resistance.
• Declaration of Francis Card
  Maine settler Francis Card reports that 14 Abenaki Indians killed three English settlers and briefly took him captive. Although Card was later freed by the French merchant Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin, his report underscored English fears that New France would send warriors, guns, and provisions to aid the Wabanaki Confederacy. This reflected their paranoia toward a French-Wabanaki alliance, and there is little to no documentary evidence of direct French involvement in King Philip’s War.
• Silvanus Davis et al. to MA Governor & Council
  As the violence continued, English settlers struggled to defend their isolated settlements in Maine. In a letter to the Massachusetts Governor and Council, Silvanus Davis, Ichabod Wiswall, and Thomas Moore propose two major changes to better defend the frontier. First, Davis and his comrades proposed a winter campaign. Second, they suggested offering a false truce to capture the Penobscot sachem Madockawando at New Harbor, ME. This second proposal is a testament to English desperation at this point in King Philip’s War.
• Brian Pendleton to MA Governor & Council
  Major Brian Pendleton writes to Massachusetts Governor John Leverett and the Massachusetts Council that when he led an expedition to Black Point, Maine, he found that the garrison had been captured except for the trader John Josselyn and a few older settlers. The English fort was reportedly occupied by 500 Indians and 300 French. Pendelton wrote that these “Indians hoe I never dealt with in all my life nor never wronged in anythinge but did hope Squando [a Kennebec sachem] would become a Christon [Protestant] & and did what I could to further it: yet they fired all my houses & dwellings Corne & Cattle neere 100 bushells Indyan Corne neere 40 bushells of pease more or les beside olde Corne Rie & Indian thay killed some sheepe some hoggs & one Cow [141].” While the English often attributed the burgeoning French-Abenaki alliance to the machinations of Jesuit missionaries, at this stage in the war the Kennebecs were motivated find cause with the French by promises of ammunition, food, and other provisions.
• William Hathorne to MA Governor & Council
  Councilman William Hathorne reports to the Massachusetts Governor & Council that his men had recently captured a Pigwacket sagamore, who “Informed vs that Kennibeck Indians [Kennebec Abenaki] were to Come Into these parts that night or the next day he told us that ye Indians In these parts are not above 30 or 40 fighting men & that these keep up at Orsybee [Oyster Bay] or peggwackeck [Pigwacket]. The sagamore also revealed that “he know of noe French men among them.” The English distrusted the Pigwacket sagamore (“wee found him in many lyes”) and executed him. Hathorne laments the difficulty of fighting the Wabanaki Indians in their homeland: “wee find itt very Difficult to Come neire them there is soe many Rivers & soe much broken land, that they soon Escape by Canoes yt Country being full of them.”
• MA Council Secretary Edward Rawson [to Major General Daniel Denison?]
  Edward Rawson, Secretary of the Massachusetts Council, writes to (most likely) Major General Daniel Denison. Rawson describes Massachusetts Governor John Leverett’s plan to convene a meeting in September with the governor of Connecticut “for ye Colonies to Consider & determine of all things Relateing to the warr.” He also conveys that Governor Leverett has issued arrest warrants for Henry Lauton and William Waldron, who are to be tried “for Seazing & Carrying away a 30 Indians where on Sagamore & his squaw to ye Eastward was a pt.” Despite repeated English accusations of Wabanaki “savagery,” their leaders always struggled to control settler violence in Maine.
• Petition of Thomas Gardiner & Other Inhabitants of Pemaquid
  Thomas Gardiner and other men from Pemaquid, Maine report to Massachusetts Governor John Leverett that most English settlers at Arrowsic and living on the Kennebec River have now fled to Mohegan Island. Gardiner therefore requests that the governor settler a garrison nearby or risk the desertion of settlements in all of Maine. Gardiner’s letter also assesses Wabanaki motives for joining King Philip’s War. First, he believes that they were persuaded to enter the conflict by the Western Abenakis, “who have set these Indianes on this ungodly Enterprise.” The second reason was “the perfidious & unjust dealing of som English as we Supose who have Stollen Eight or Nine persones from the Indianes About Micheas River [Machias River] &. Caried them Away.” Finally, the Wabanakis lacked the gunpowder to hunt and were forced to visit Canada to avoid starvation, where Gardiner implies they were influenced by pro-French Indians. Despite his bias, Gardiner is relatively honest about English culpability in the war.
• MA Council Secretary Edward Rawson to Major Brian Pendleton and Major Richard Waldron
  As Abenaki warriors continue to decimate English towns in Maine and New Hampshire, Massachusetts Council Secretary Edward Rawson reluctantly opens the door for peace negotiations Rawson advises Majors Brian Pendleton and Richard Waldon that the council has received a peace overture from the Kennebec Sagamore Squando. The officers are ordered to in “the name of the Governor & Councill promise them a Safe Conduct coming & returning hither in way of treaty whether any thing Concluded or no as Mog [a Kennebec sachem] formerly Had.” This measure is taken to prevent inexperienced colonial officers from agreeing to Wabanaki demands without consent from Boston. Despite these peace overtures, the English remain suspicious of the Wabanakis. Rawson advises Pendleton and Waldron to “be upon your watch & guard for your own security.”
• [MA Governor & Council] Instructions for Major General Denison & Joseph Dudley
  After receiving the letter from Moxes and his fellow Wabanaki sachems, Massachusetts Governor John Leverett and his council order Major General Daniel Denison and Esquire Joseph Dudley to negotiate a peace. Adhering to Wabanaki diplomatic customs, Leverett advises Denison and Dudley to “the speediest & best way of Coming to speake wth the Natives [opening negotiation is] either by sending out the Squa [Squaw] or otherwise. He adds that “you shall endeavor to Sattisty those Indians that the Governor & Council are Ignorant of those many Injuries by them Complained of” and that “the persons that have don the injuries were disorderly persons that lined out of our Jurisdiction” and would be prevented “by a more orderly & full setlement of Government in those parts.” Though the English constantly viewed the Wabanakis as a monolithic “heathen” threat, Leverett and other leaders were often quick to deflect blame for settler violence.
• Moxes & Indians to MA Governor
  Moxes and several Wabanaki sachems negotiate with Massachusetts Governor John Leverett. The sachems describe how his people (the Kennebec Indians) have treated English prisoners well and have driven away the Androscoggin Indians, who are determined to continue war with New England. Desperate for provisions, the sachems add “we are willing to trade with you as we have done for many years [and] we pray you send us such things as we name powder cloth tobacko [tobacco] liker corn bread and send the captives you toke at Pemaquid.” The Wabanaki sachems return 20 captives to the English as a gesture of their sincerity. These negotiations underscore the growing political factionalism within the Wabanaki Confederacy.
• MA Council to Secretary of State Edward Randolph
  The Massachusetts Council elaborates on the devastating raids launched by Wabanaki warriors in a letter to British Secretary of State Edward Randolph. In the eight months since King Philip’s War erupted in Maine, these raids “dispced [displaced] all our the Country 2 or 300 myles from Kenebeck [Kennebec, ME] noreast to the utmost bounds of Conect [Connecticut] Jurisdiction southwest.” Showing their anti-Catholic bias, the councilmen claim without evidence that French Jesuit missionaries are orchestrating these raids and blame French and Dutch traders for selling guns to Wabanaki tribes. The Council’s letter ends with a plea for “money amunicon & amies for the Country is become poore & brought very lowe.”
• Phillip [sic] alias Metacomet of Pokanoket
  Portrait of King Philip or Metacom, a native American, holding a gun or musket. In the background native Americans smoke a pipe. Cultural artifacts include beaded wampum belt, powder horn, feathered headdress, knife, and moccasins. Further notes in the metatdata read: Benjamin Church, 1639-1718, led English troops against the native population during King Philip’s War, which ended when Church captured King Philip (or Metacom) who was chief of the Wampanoag. Samuel Gardner Drake, one of the first antiquarian booksellers in North America and an American Indian historian, reprinted Church’s history in 1825.